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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 June 1958

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Hungary: In Budapest, the post-Nagy atmosphere is one of terror. Amid reports of new trials in the offing, the police have been reinforced and are said to be arresting persons who talk openly of the affair. The only top official comment on the execution has come from two Stalinists in the party and the regime; this suggests that Kadar's faction may be losing control of the party.

25X1

no
Yugoslavia: Belgrade expects a continuation of the Sino-Soviet bloc campaign against Yugoslavia that has developed in recent months. The Yugoslavs do not discount the possibility of "military pressure." Belgrade has reacted strongly to the execution of Nagy, and sees his "murder" as a "dreadful warning" to those who oppose the return of Stalinism in the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslavs have called on anti-Stalinist elements in the Communist world to give "moral and political support" in the fight against Moscow.

25X1

yes
USSR: The organized demonstrations against the Danish and West German embassies in Moscow constitute the Soviet Government's reprisal against violent demonstrations against Soviet missions in at least six Western countries, including Denmark and West Germany. The only precedent for such actions in Moscow occurred in November 1956, when there were nonviolent demonstrations involving the embassies of the countries involved in the Suez crisis.
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no Czechoslovakia: Prague's decision to strengthen its security forces and to improve the political reliability of the army is designed to eliminate "bourgeois influences" and will have the effect of establishing a harsher police state. The Czech Communist party declared that this task was of overriding importance if Czechoslovakia is to move forward in the development of "socialism." This decision follows the recent CEMA meeting which will apparently result in a lowered standard of living for Czechoslovakia.

[REDACTED]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

[REDACTED]

no UN-Lebanon: Hammarskjold is firmly opposed to the introduction of any outside military force, under UN auspices or otherwise, fearing it might set off a much larger conflagration. He sees the UN's responsibility as confined solely to the elimination of foreign intervention. If Nasir ignores his warning that the UAR interference must cease, Hammarskjold is prepared to request economic sanctions and to brand the UAR an "aggressor."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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[REDACTED]

25X1

yes
Cyprus: Security forces on the island are in control, but the situation remains tense. The Greek minority in Istanbul is fearful of the increasingly bellicose atmosphere. There is no evidence of unusual military activity in western or southern Turkey. [REDACTED]

25X1

III. THE WEST

yes
France: Rightist elements in France and Algeria, including Georges Bidault, are sharply critical of De Gaulle's agreement for a partial evacuation of French troops from Tunisia. Their disillusionment with the general will probably intensify, as he moves to withdraw some French forces from Morocco. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Hungary's Kadar Silent on Nagy Execution

The only authoritative Hungarian statements to date on the executions of Nagy and his associates have been made by two Stalinists who are reported to be leading the opposition to Kadar--Antal Apro and Karoly Kiss. This supports informed speculation in Budapest that Kadar may be in danger of losing control of the party. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Kadar, in view of his close connection with Nagy during the national uprising and statements he made at that time in support of Nagy, was "undoubtedly" opposed to this solution of the problem.

Kadar may have avoided participation in the announcement of the Nagy execution, in an effort to disassociate himself as much as possible, but his own equivocal position in the affair will play into the hands of his opponents in the party and may lead to the deterioration of his position in Moscow.

The first reaction of the Budapest populace of shock, horror, and disgust at the Hungarian regime--and even more at the USSR--has now developed into an atmosphere of tension and fear--the most intense since the mass arrests of last autumn. Police have reportedly been reinforced and are arresting anyone who openly discusses these events. Although no overt demonstrations have taken place in Budapest, the wife of a legation employee observed a near-demonstration on 17 June when market workers excitedly discussed the matter in loud and angry tones. Hungarians now feel that Nagy and Maleter, by refusing to admit the regime's charges against them, have increased their stature to the point that they can be regarded as martyrs, according to the legation. [REDACTED]

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Soviet-German Demonstrations

The violent attacks on the Danish and West German embassies in Moscow--organized in retaliation for the demonstrations which took place at the Soviet embassies in Copenhagen and Bonn over the week end protesting Nagy's execution--reflect the Soviet Government's reaction to the demonstrations against Soviet missions in at least a half dozen other Western countries. They also are designed to inhibit additional protests in the free world. These latest Soviet actions contrast with the nonviolent demonstrations before the British, French, and Israeli embassies at the time of the Suez attack and do not appear specifically aimed at Denmark or West Germany. Rather they are defensive reactions, revealing the USSR's sensitivity to the extremely adverse world reaction brought on by the news of the Hungarian executions.

They were also apparently intended to show displeasure over what Moscow considers the failure of Western governments to exercise adequate control over the demonstrations. Gromyko on 19 June summoned the Danish ambassador in Moscow and protested that the Danish Government, despite advance knowledge, failed to provide necessary protection and that the police encouraged the participants. Similar though less violent demonstrations are known to have taken place at Soviet missions in the United States, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Switzerland, and Norway.

The Moscow demonstration against the West German Embassy, coming one day after the 17th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Russia in World War II, could seriously damage the USSR's efforts to improve relations with Bonn. The crowd is reported to have reached 1,000 in number and the intensity of the attack suggests it may have gotten out of control.

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Hammarskjold Opposed to Use of Any Outside Military Force in Lebanon

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold is firmly opposed to bringing any outside military force into Lebanon, under UN auspices or otherwise, fearing it might set off a much larger conflagration. Taking the position that the UN's responsibility is confined to the elimination of foreign intervention, Hammarskjold hopes to achieve this by warning Nasir of the serious consequences of continued UAR interference in Lebanese affairs. If unsuccessful, the secretary general is prepared to request the Security Council, and if necessary the General Assembly, to vote economic sanctions against the UAR as an "aggressor." He is scheduled to return to New York on 26 June.

Hammaraskjold's opposition to a UN military force in Lebanon stems, in part, from his belief that an adequate force--which he sets at 7,500 men--could not be raised quickly, if at all, from among the small-member nations of the UN. He regards UN use of forces from the major powers as impossible, presumably because this would entail use of Soviet forces and also because of the precedent set by the UNEF's composition. He believes any UN force would have to fight its way across Lebanon in order to reach the border area, with consequent killing of Lebanese nationals. He also fears that the predominantly Christian composition of any UN force would raise an "ugly religious issue" with repercussions throughout the Arab world.

Hammaraskjold's personal observations and his talks with Lebanese Government leaders have evidently convinced him he cannot now stake the UN's prestige and possible future effectiveness in the Middle East on the Lebanese situation. Conceding extensive infiltration by the UAR, which he estimates at 5,000-6,000 infiltrators, he still believes the rebellion is largely an internal affair which must be resolved by the Lebanese themselves once UAR intervention ceases.

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Cyprus

Members of the Greek minority in Istanbul "fear for their lives," according to the American consul general in Istanbul. Isolated incidents, including assaults on several Greeks, have occurred recently as long-time Greek-Turkish animosity has been intensified over the Cyprus controversy. The relatively mild reaction of the press in Istanbul to announcement of the new British proposals for Cyprus may help to calm the tense situation.

The reported killing by the British of Colonel George Grivas, alias "Digenis," leader of the Greek-Cypriot underground organization EOKA, on 22 June could have far-reaching effects, if true. His death or imminent capture, however, has been reported several times during the three years since EOKA launched its all-out campaign against the British on 1 April 1955.

Grivas has been able to inspire intense loyalty from his followers, and his death would be an incalculable loss to EOKA. The tightly organized, right-wing, terrorist organization has been able by violence and the threat of violence to intimidate a large part of the Greek-Cypriot population to support actively, or at least not oppose, its aims and activities. As most of Grivas' lieutenants have been killed or captured, and there is no one known at present who could replace him, EOKA might rapidly disintegrate into small groups, operating without benefit of coordination. British efforts to prevent future EOKA attacks would thus be made easier, although isolated acts of violence might still occur.

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III. THE WEST

French Rightists Increasingly Disillusioned With De Gaulle

Rightist elements in France and Algeria are sharply critical of De Gaulle's agreement for partial evacuation of French forces from Tunisia. Former Premier Georges Bidault has warned De Gaulle of possible repercussions if French troops "retreat" from Tunisia and subsequently from Morocco. The All-Algeria Committee of Public Safety on 20 June criticized the Tunisian agreement and De Gaulle's decision to bring Socialist leader Guy Mollet with him on his 2 July visit to Algiers.

De Gaulle's visit may serve to crystallize opposition and also to clarify the position of the army, without which the extremist civilian groups would be ineffective. It is unlikely that De Gaulle would undertake this second trip to Algiers unless he felt sure of complete army support.

Meanwhile, extremist leaders continue to organize opposition to De Gaulle. The Algiers Committee has inaugurated a biweekly newspaper to coordinate the actions of all public safety committees. Paul Antier, leader of the rightist Peasant party, says he is working closely with Pierre Poujade and with General Chassin's public safety groups to organize a clandestine resistance to the De Gaulle government. Antier predicts a rightist take-over in France within two months. He believes the majority of De Gaulle's former right-wing supporters have lost faith in De Gaulle's ability to achieve either an Algerian settlement or financial stability for France. The public safety movement in France so far appears to have only limited support, although it will probably grow as De Gaulle's plans for constitutional revision and for North Africa become clearer.

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